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ARGUMENT
.1 .
AN ACTUAL PHYSICAL "TAKING" HAS BEEN EFFECTED
The Court of Appeals should keep in mind about what
THIS CASE is actually about: it is about a "taking" of
private

property

government

for

public

use

here Salt Lake County

and

for

which

the

has creatively

and

successfully resisted the Constitutions' command that "just
compensation" be paid!

9

This case does not involve a "regulatory taking" (such
as a zoning ordinance which prescribes
certain uses,
property).

thus diminishing

This

case

presents

limitations on

the value of the real
an

ACTUAL,

PHYSICAL,

POSSESSION-PRECLUDING "TAKING" IN THE CLASSIC SENSE. Thus,
the applicable court decisions

such as Nollan and Dolan

involving such "takings" and which have been decided
the state and national level

at

should be the Court's initial

focus and inquiry.
The "regulatory takings" cases cited by the COUNTY,
although perhaps enlightening, are not directly on point.
However, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in
Nollan vs California Coastal Commission, 107 SCt 3141 (1987)
[hereinafter "Nollan"] and Dolan vs City of Tigard, 114 SCt
2309 (1994) [hereinafter "Dolan"] are EXACTLY ON POINT AND
ARE CONTROLLING

notwithstanding the assertions of the

Defendant to the contrary! Nollan and Dolan which concerned
the actual dedication and physical occupation of real
property, WHICH IS THE SITUATION-AT-HANDi
This case is NOT about some ethereal, speculative
damages which might have happened (for example, under a
"regulatory taking"). "Regulatory takings" cases, being
intrinsically speculative, are frequently disposed of as
being not "ripe for judicial decision". See Williamson

3

County Regional Planning Commission vs Hamilton Bank of
Johnson City, 473 US 172 (1985) and Palazzolo vs Rhode
Island, 533 US 606 (2001) . Williamson and Palazzolo both
involved "regulatory takings" (such as a zoning ordinance
which limited "uses" of an owner's land): the owner retained
ownership and possession. Thus, it would be proper to assure
that the government had actually come to a "final decision"
as to the scope and depth of its ordinance, before the
courts took over. However, in the instant case, the case is
ABSOLUTELY "RIPE" for decision: the Plaintiff has been
forced to give up his property! Similarly, the Plaintiff HAS
IN FACT

"exhausted"

its administrative

remedies. Four

distinct "letters of claim" letters were written to the
COUNTY in the spring and early summer of 1998 advising the
COUNTY of Plaintiff's "constitutional" claims (vis-a-vis the
required roadway improvements) . Those assertions

together

with face-to-face meetings with the COUNTY administrative
staff and the COUNTY Planning Commission

were consistently

rebuffed

COUNTY

and

ignored.

Finally,

the

Board

of

Commissioners (County Commission) DENIED the Plaintiff's
request for a hearing on the issues. And after all of that,
the COUNTY still had AN ENTIRE YEAR---from August 1998 (when
the lawsuit was filed) until August 1999 (when the Westridge
Meadows subdivision was finally approved)

in which to

reconsider its requirements. So to say that the Plaintiff
failed

to

"exhaust

its

administrative

remedies"

is

intellectually-dishonest, disingenuous, and contrary to the
truth and the evidence in the case!
This case is not, at this time, about a "facial"
challenge to the COUNTY'S ordinance requirements. [Plaintiff
does acknowledge that the "facial" unconstitutionality of
the COUNTY'S

ordinances

and regulations was

initially

pleaded. However, with the passage of time and the ultimate
approval

of the development

albeit with

roadway dedication and improvement required

the 53-foot
the "facial"

challenge has effectively MERGED INTO and been totally
consumed by the "as applied" nature of the "taking". Thus,
most

if not all

of the argument and analysis the COUNTY

has undertaken in pages 13 through 25 of its BRIEF is
incorrectly presented.]
Furthermore, the COUNTY has consistently taken the
position that the provisions of its ordinances cannot be
wavered and that those provisions will be enforced, as
written. That position has been reaffirmed in this Court. To
now claim that the COUNTY might have changed its position if
it (the COUNTY) had been asked to do so is disingenuous,
intellectually-dishonest, and contrary to the evidence. [The
Plaintiff presented evidence that the Plaintiff attempted to

R

negotiate with the COUNTY to not install the required
improvements, etc., until the roadway was actually widened
by UDOT. That approach was REJECTED by the COUNTY, which
mandated the present installation of all of the improvements
and the full dedication of the entire 53-foot half-width
right-of-way!]
This case presents claims for ACTUAL, PROVEN ECONOMIC
COSTS

AND

EXPENSES

unconstitutionally

FORCED

the

Plaintiff-Appellant

to incur, including

but not

limited to:
1.

The value of the real estate from the existing

edge of the existing pavement of 3500 South to the
fully improved (paved) width thereof, to the 53foot "half-width" of the improved roadway; AND
2.

The

value

of

the

engineering,

roadway

preparation and materials (such as roadbase and
asphalt) the Plaintiff-Appellant was forced to
purchase in the development of that roadway; AND
3.

The value of the related improvements mandated

upon the developer, namely:
a.

the

costs

associated

with

the ;

installation of almost 900 linear feet of
curb, gutter, and sidewalk, along the
3500 South Street right-of-way; AND
c

was

b.

the

improving

costs
a

of

relocating

pre-existing

and/or

underground

storm drainage line located within the
3 5 00 South Street right-of-way; AND
c.

the

costs

of

relocating

several

(i.e. 6) electrical power line poles, to
accommodate the mandated street widening;
AND
4.

The value of installing almost 900 linear feet

of impassable fencing along the south side of the
street improvements, thus effectively denying the
abutting residents any value (or "benefit") to
such street improvements, which benefit ONLY the
public-at-large; AND
5.

The value of two "building lots" lost because

of the excessive in-kind dedications

(of real

estate) required by Defendant SALT LAKE COUNTY.
The Plaintiff's unrebutted testimony as to the aggregate
value of the foregoing "costs" and/or "losses" was $200,000--which the Plaintiff was coerced to "pay" when similarlysituated developers were required to pay NOTHING! [The
electrical power line relocation and the underground storm
sewer line were NOT necessitated by the development of the
subject subdivision! Such relocations were effected
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as

required

by

the

COUNTY

strictly

as

part

of

the

comprehensive improvement of the 3500 South Street roadway.]
This case comes down to a relatively simple question:
is it "reasonable" to require the single propertyowner (the
Plaintiff,

as developer)

to pay

100% of

those

roadway

improvement costs, when his development contributes less
than 3% of the roadway traffic utilizing the roadway? Nollan
says

"No!".

Dolan

says

"No!"

Banberry

Development

Corporation vs South Jordan City, 631 P. 2d 899 (Utah 1981)
and the Utah appellate court decisions say "No!" But then
Defendant COUNTY says those decisions and principles don't
apply! How creative and novel the COUNTY is to avoid the
requirements of the Constitutions that the government pay
for those improvements!
• ' II '
THE COUNTY'S GEOGRAPHY-BASED
AS CONTRASTED WITH
AN IMPACT-BASED
METHOD OF OBTAINING PUBLIC
ROADWAY IMPROVEMENTS IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The Defendant SALT LAKE COUNTY has been surprisingly
candid in acknowledging and defending the geography-based
method of requiring roadway improvements, as a pre-condition
for

development

approval

of

"abutting

properties".

Fundamentally, the COUNTY'S approach is relatively simple:
if the development is adjacent to the mapped right-of-way
lines of a major roadway, the developer must pay 100% of the

costs! Similarly-situated developers in the immediate area,
contributing the exact same "impact"

(i.e. measured in

vehicles on the roadway) , PAY NOTHING if their parcels don't
abut the designated roadway!
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the
cases of Nollan vs California Coastal Commission, 107 SCt
3141 (1987) [hereinafter "Nollan"] and Dolan vs City of
Tigard, 114 SCt 2309 (1994) [hereinafter "Dolan"] are THE
DEFINITIVE CASES for these

"roadway

dedication/in-kind

exaction" claims.
The COUNTY argues [p. 3 6 et seq of its BRIEF before
this Court]
argument

and the District Court accepted the COUNTY'S
that the "rational basis" case law decisions

such as Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama vs
Garrett, 121 SCt 955 (USSCt 2001)

are controlling in the

case-at-hand and that the "takings" case law decisions
such as Nollan and Dolan

are inappropriate. WRONG! WRONG!

WRONG!
The

inappropriateness

of

the Garrett

decision

is

readily demonstrated by the background facts of the decision
itself. Garrett involved claims of discrimination against
"disabled persons" and whether certain congressionallyadopted provisions ran afoul of the Eleventh Amendment. Any
"rational basis" analysis, testing and/or conclusion using

the "constitutional law" standards discussed in Garrett are
clearly inappropriate, particularly in light of the clearlyapplicable fact situations presented in Nollan and in Dolan!
Similarly, the COUNTY'S reliance
Court's

recitation

of

and the District

"rational basis"

cases

such

as

Little America Hotel vs Salt Lake City Corporation, 785 P. 2d
1106

(Utah Supreme Court

1989) is similarly misplaced.

Little America Hotel involved a generalized claim of "denial
of equal protection". Little America Hotel
"innkeeper's

tax"

is

limited

in

its

involving the
jurisprudential

application. There is no expressed "constitutional right" to
be immune from an "innkeeper's tax". BUT THERE ARE EXPRESS
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
STATE CONSTITUTIONS

IN BOTH THE NATIONAL AND THE

WHICH REQUIRE THE GOVERNMENT TO PAY

"COMPENSATION" WHEN PRIVATE PROPERTY IS TAKEN FOR "PUBLIC
USE"I 1

i

In this context, the situation-at-hand is correctly
analyzed and anticipated by the United States Supreme Court
in the following clear-cut description:
x

It is noteworthy and almost unbelievable how creative
governments and their civil-servant attorneys can be in IGNORING
THE CLEAR MANDATE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS THEY---like the judges of
this Court---ARE SWORN TO UPHOLD!
While attorneys and judges might be able to argue the
sophistries and mysteries of such nebulous concepts as "free
speech" under the First Amendment or "unreasonable searches" under
the Fourth Amendment, the clear mandate of the Takings Clause (s) is
beyond serious intellectual discussion! The Constitutions mandate
that governments pay for the private property taken!

We view the Fifth Amendments property clause to
be more than a pleading requirement, and
compliance with it more than an exercise in
cleverness and imagination. As indicated earlier,
our cases describe the condition for abridgement
of property rights through the police power as a
"substantial advancing" of a legitimate State
interest. We are inclined to be particularly
careful about the objective where the actual
conveyance of property is made a condition to the
lifting of a land use restriction, since in that
context there is a heightened risk that the
purpose
is avoidance
of
the
compensation
requirement, rather than the stated police power
objective.
107 SCt at 3150-51. Emphasis added.
In the case-at-hand, the Defendant COUNTY
District Court

and the

have engaged in an "exercise in cleverness

and imagination". The COUNTY'S arguments

albeit candidly

admitting the operational effect of its highway-abutting
dedication
"heightened
requirement

requirement
risk"
is

requirement"! As

that
the

certainly
the purpose

"avoidance

such,

that's

illuminate
of

of
simply

the

the

the

dedication

compensation

constitutionally

impermissible!
The COUNTY cites [p. 15 of its BRIEF] to the decision
of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Lucas vs
South Carolina Coastal Commission, 112 SCt 2886 (USSCt 1992)
and quotes its "holding" as
" . . . [a] statute regulating the uses that can be
made of property effects a taking if it "denies an
owner economically viable use of his land".
11

Id. at 2894. The COUNTY then asserts that because the
developer still had 44 lots of real estate left, there was
no unconstitutional taking. WRONG! The COUNTY
"dedication" and improvement requirement

through the

HAS IN FACT AND

IN LAW "taken" the 53 feet roadway area and has denied the
owner (the Plaintiff) of all "economically viable use" of
his land! The real estate was, through coercion, dedicated
to the public. The developer no longer owns the property.
The property is now a public street! What possible "economic
use" could be made thereof by the developer (as an "owner")?
[Lucas, being a "regulatory taking", is for that reason
alone, technically inapplicable to the case-at-hand, which
involves an ACTUAL, POSSESSORY TAKING!]
The COUNTY asserts

[p. 38 of its BRIEF] that the

residents of the Westridge Meadows gain a benefit from the
"widened"

(improved) condition of the 3500 South Street

roadway. WRONG! The evidence (testimony from Andrea Pullos,
County Traffic Engineer) was that the widening would shave
a

few

seconds

propertyowners
large

off

the

drive

time.

The

residential

other than as members of the public at

gain NO DEFINABLE BENEFIT in the widened roadway. In

fact, there is almost a detrimental effect of being adjacent
to a major 5-lane or 7-lane roadway! The COUNTY-mandated
impassable "fencing" along the south right-of-way line of

the roadway prevents any of those residents from gaining
direct access to 3500 South Street.
This situation must certainly be contrasted with a
"commercial" development, such as a shopping center. In the
"commercial" setting, the developer would probably welcome
the opportunity for a 7-lane roadway in front of its
shopping center! That propertyowner wants as much visibility
and accessibility as possible. For a shopping center, there
would be a 4-lane "driveway-entrance" into the parking lot
couple of hundred feet. And the "commercial" developer gets
full advantage of the roadway improvements
sidewalk

curb, gutter,

because the developer INSTALLS THEM ONLY ONCE. In

the "residential" setting

for example, Westridge Meadows--

-the Plaintiff was required to install TWO SETS of curb,
gutter and sidewalk: one set on the "internal" street
actually used by the residences of the subdivision and a
SECOND set along 3500 South Street, which
COUNTY-mandated fencing

because of the

cannot be used at all by the

residents! These are the ACTUAL DOLLARS "costs" which this
litigation sought to recover!
The immediately adj acent subdivision
to the south

Elusive Meadows,

had essentially the SAME IMPACT! Yet Elusive

Meadows PAYS NOTHING! And it is the developer
residents

not the

who actually ends of paying these expenses,

because he cannot effectively divide the $200,000 "cost"
across the 44 lots he was allowed (= about $4500 per "lot"
increase) and still remain competitive with the "building
lots" in Elusive Meadows a hundred yards away* Thus, one
person

the developer

effectively shoulders the financial

burden which should be shouldered by ALL! [In this same
vein, were the COUNTY to have

it doesn't

a "road impact

fee", then perhaps the adjoining Elusive Meadows would be
paying something (ala, its "proportionate share") for the
roadway improvement expenses. But per state statute, the
COUNTY is prohibited from assessing a "road impact fee" for
improving

State-

and

Federal-controlled

roadways! The

"bottom line" is that Elusive Meadows PAYS NOTHING and the
Plaintiff PAYS EVERYTHING! That's not "reasonable"! It's not
"equal protection". And it's not constitutional!
The COUNTY argues

[p. 3 7 of its BRIEF before this

Court] that the Plaintiff-developer, having purchased the
subject real estate after the "highway-abutting dedication
requirements" were in place, thus should have known of such
requirements and should be deemed to have waived any right
to claim "just compensation". This spurious argument is
SIMPLY WRONG

for at least two reasons:

First, because the logical conclusion (i.e. no
compensation is paid) ignores the clear mandate of

the Constitutions.

.'

Secondly, because it ignores the practical
effect of the COUNTY'S "program" upon the ORIGINAL
LANDOWNER, who arguably (hypothetically) owned the
real estate BEFORE the government adopted its
"program" (of uncompensated "takings").
This

latter

reason

can

be

illustrated

by

a

simple

hypothetical situation. The Court will be familiar generally
with the Utah Department of Transportation [UDOT] proposal
to build the "Legacy Highway" through Davis County, between
the existing 1-15 freeway and the eastern boundary of the
Great Salt Lake. If, for example, a given landowner (of real
estate within the planned "right-of-way" of the "Legacy
Highway" alignment) were to sell that real estate to a
private

"buyer", would that "buyer" be deemed to have

forfeited his right to claim "just compensation" in eminent
domain proceedings filed by UDOT to acquire the necessary
real estate? ABSOLUTELY NOT!
The SALT LAKE COUNTY situation is NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY

DIFFERENT! Merely because the COUNTY may have adopted years
ago "a plan" does not excuse the COUNTY from obeying the
clear mandate of the Constitutions. The "plan" (requiring
highway-abutting developers to pay ONE HUNDRED PERCENT OF
THE COSTS of such "public use" roadways) is not, in-and-of-

itself, justification under the "rational basis" analysis of
the court decisions improperly cited by the COUNTY, when
Nollan and Dolan are so directly on point!
CONCLUSION

-

Nollan and Dolan are THE DEFINITIVE CASES

-l
(at the

federal level) for this case! Simply stated, the COUNTY'S
dedication and improvement requirements, contained within
its adopted and consistently enforced ordinances, offend the
constitutional principles described in Nollan and Dolan and
in the Utah appellate court decisions! The COUNTY'S approach
is simply a self-serving method of AVOIDING the clear
MANDATE of the CONSTITUTIONS that the costs of the public
improvements should be borne by the public-at-large, and not
merely this single propertyowner!
Not only is the Takings Clause implicated, but "equal
protection" (under the national Constitution) and "uniform
operation of laws" (under the Utah Constitution) principles
are violated by the COUNTY'S approach, in which similarlysituated developers are treated with great disparity!
The decision of the District Court
incorrect legal basis

decided upon an

must be set aside and the case

remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the Plaintiff,
awarding

it

the

"just

compensation"

property taken for public use".

for

the

"private

Respectfully submitted this 13th day of June, 2002
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